Most attacks on government websites are not sophisticated. They are floods of traffic timed to an election, a summit or an arrest, and homepage edits made through an extension nobody patched. This guide sets out what the public threat data shows, what edge controls handle well, and the operating practices that keep official sites online and under your control.
What the threat data shows
The ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 analysed 4,875 incidents in the EU between July 2024 and June 2025. DDoS attacks made up about 77% of them. Public administration was the most targeted sector, at 38.2% of incidents where a sector was known, and hacktivist-led DDoS accounted for 96.2% of the incidents against it. ENISA also found that defacements were almost exclusively the work of hacktivists, used for visibility and protest.
The same report adds an important qualifier: only 2% of hacktivist incidents resulted in service disruption. Volume is high and most attempts fail. The ones that succeed tend to land on the days that matter.
One group dominates the European picture. Recorded Future's analysis of NoName057(16) counted 3,776 distinct hosts targeted between July 2024 and July 2025, an average of 50 a day, with government and public sector targets making up 41.09% of attacks. Eurojust describes the group timing attacks to the European elections, a NATO summit, and a video address by the Ukrainian President to the Swiss parliament. An international operation in July 2025 disrupted more than 100 of its servers and led to seven arrest warrants. Imperva researchers reported that within weeks the group's published target lists had grown from about 10 sites a day to about 18, with municipal, police and government portals prominent.
The pattern is not confined to Europe or to central government. In January 2026 the UK's National Cyber Security Centre warned local authorities and critical infrastructure operators about persistent denial-of-service attacks, noting that although these attacks "may be technically simple, their impact can be significant."
How DDoS attacks hit a public website
The joint DDoS guide from CISA, the FBI and MS-ISAC separates attacks into three types. Volumetric attacks try to consume bandwidth. Protocol attacks exploit weaknesses in network protocols. Application attacks send requests that look like ordinary use but target what is expensive to serve.
For most government sites the application layer is where it hurts. A search box, an uncached results page, a login form or a PDF generator can each cost the server far more than a static page. Crowd-sourced tools of the kind NoName057(16) distributes to volunteers, around 4,000 of them according to Eurojust, send that traffic from many ordinary-looking sources, so blocking a handful of addresses achieves little.
What the edge handles, and what it does not
The NCSC's January 2026 alert to local government, which points to its denial-of-service guidance, recommends upstream defences: understand what your internet provider already mitigates, consider third-party DDoS mitigation, and consider a content delivery network for web services. An edge layer on a global CDN absorbs volumetric and protocol floods away from your origin. It serves cached public pages so that a request storm hits the cache instead of the database. It applies traffic limits per source, filters traffic from hosting networks and fake bots, asks suspicious clients for human verification, and lets you tighten everything at once when a campaign starts. BrandPort's Firewall and traffic limits and Website and government firewall services sit at this layer, and our first guide covers how agencies and enterprises secure their websites at the edge in more detail.
The edge has limits that are worth stating plainly. If your origin server's address is public and accepts connections from anyone, attackers can go around the edge entirely, so restrict the origin to traffic from your edge provider. Services that are not websites, such as DNS, email and remote access, need their own protection. And no edge layer will save an application that falls over under modest load because every page view queries the database.
Make the expensive parts cheap
Cache pages for anonymous visitors wherever the content allows. Publish high-demand pages, such as election results, emergency notices and deadline reminders, as static pages that can be served from cache. Apply tighter traffic limits to search, login and form endpoints than to ordinary pages. Where a form feeds a back-office system, queue submissions instead of processing them while the citizen waits.
Plan to degrade gracefully
The NCSC advises designing services to keep operating in a degraded state, retaining administrative access during an attack, and having a fallback for essential services. In practice that means a static version of critical pages ready to publish, a status page hosted on separate infrastructure, and an agreed route for urgent notices through official social media accounts or SMS if the website is unreachable. Make sure the people who need to change edge settings can still reach the admin console when the public site cannot be reached.
Work from the calendar
Hacktivist campaigns follow the news. Put elections, budget days, summits, court rulings and national commemorations on the security team's calendar. Tighten traffic limits and verification before those dates, staff the operations desk, and confirm the contact route to your providers.
Test and rehearse
The NCSC recommends testing defences so you know which types and volumes of attack you can handle, and monitoring so you can see when an attack starts. Agree any load test with your providers first. Then rehearse the human side: who decides to switch on "under attack" mode, who approves it out of hours, and who tells the communications team what to say.
Defacement is an access problem
The Australian Cyber Security Centre's website guidance defines defacement as someone changing your website without your knowledge, through unauthorised access to the back end, an exploited vulnerability or malware. For a government body, the content of an altered page matters less than what it proves: someone else had write access to an official channel.
In July 2026 the Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium warned of a mass defacement campaign exploiting unauthenticated file-upload flaws in extensions for a widely used open-source content management system. CCB described the targeting as broad and opportunistic, not sector-specific. Its advisory makes the point every incident team should remember: the access needed to change a homepage is usually enough to plant a hidden web shell, create a rogue administrator account or add phishing pages. A defacement should be handled as a compromise, not a cosmetic fault.
The edge plays a supporting part. A web application firewall can filter requests aimed at known vulnerable endpoints and buy time while you patch, and CCB lists one among its recommendations. It cannot stop someone who logs in with a stolen password and presses publish, and it will faithfully serve whatever the origin serves. Prevention sits mostly with the practices below.
Patch and shrink the content system
Keep the content management system, its extensions and its themes on a patch schedule with a named owner, whether that is your team or a supplier. The UK Government Digital Service's security overview for websites treats this as a must-do and suggests agreeing in advance any periods around key events when patches might be paused. Remove extensions you no longer use. Block script execution in upload and media directories at the web server, as CCB recommends.
Control who can publish
Use named accounts everywhere, from the registrar to the content system, with single sign-on where available. Require multi-factor authentication on every account that can publish or change configuration; GDS suggests phishing-resistant methods such as hardware security keys for privileged accounts. Apply least privilege: in the ACSC's example, developers hold configuration rights while marketing staff can only publish pages. Review access whenever someone changes role or leaves. Keep the administration panel off the open internet, restricted by network or behind zero-trust access, and keep the number of administrator accounts small. For the homepage and other high-visibility pages, require a second person to approve changes.
Protect the domain itself
A hijacked domain is a defacement that never touches your servers. Protect registrar and DNS accounts with the same multi-factor authentication as the content system, turn on registrar locks where your registrar offers them, and follow the ACSC's advice to auto-renew and to list more than one person for renewal notices.
Watch for changes
Monitor the web root and template directories for file changes. Run scheduled checks that compare your homepage and other key pages against expected content, and route the alerts to someone who will see them at night. Review logs for unexpected uploads, new administrator accounts and unusual logins. Pages can also be altered in the visitor's browser through a compromised third-party script, which we covered in our guide to third-party script security.
Keep backups you can restore from
CCB recommends isolated, automated backups held outside the primary hosting environment. Test a full restore at least once, and record how far back you would need to go to be confident a backup predates the compromise.
When a site is defaced: a short playbook
- Replace the affected site with a prepared static maintenance page served from the edge or a separate host. Do not simply edit the defacement out.
- Preserve evidence first: logs, altered files and account lists.
- Isolate the affected system and search it for web shells, unexpected files and rogue accounts.
- Rotate every credential that touches the site: content system, database, hosting panel, registrar and API keys.
- Rebuild from a verified clean backup and close the entry point before reconnecting. As CCB notes, patching protects against future exploitation but does not remediate a past compromise.
- Report to your national CERT, and publish a short factual statement through official channels.
- Review what allowed the access and update the patch schedule, access list and monitoring.
Checklist for government website resilience
| Control | What good looks like |
|---|---|
| Upstream protection | Every public website behind an edge layer on a CDN, with your internet provider's mitigations understood. |
| Origin lockdown | The origin accepts web traffic only from the edge provider. |
| Expensive endpoints | Search, login and forms carry tighter traffic limits; high-demand pages are cacheable or static. |
| Degraded mode | Static fallback pages, a separately hosted status page and an agreed out-of-band notice route. |
| Event calendar | Elections, summits and announcements logged, with defences tightened and staff on duty beforehand. |
| Rehearsal | "Under attack" mode tested, with named people to switch it on and approve it out of hours. |
| Patching | Content system, extensions and themes patched on schedule; unused extensions removed. |
| Publishing access | Named accounts, MFA on all publishers, least privilege, admin panel off the open internet. |
| Domain control | Registrar and DNS accounts on MFA, registrar lock on, renewal contacts shared. |
| Change monitoring | File and content checks on key pages, with alerts that reach someone out of hours. |
| Backups | Isolated, automated, restore-tested backups outside the primary hosting. |
| Playbook | A written defacement procedure covering evidence, rebuild, credential rotation and reporting. |
Frequently asked questions
Can a CDN stop DDoS attacks on government websites?
A CDN-based edge layer absorbs volumetric and protocol floods and serves cached pages, which removes most of the pressure from your origin. It needs support from the rest of the design: an origin that only accepts edge traffic, tighter limits on expensive endpoints such as search and login, and a plan for degraded operation.
Is a DDoS attack a data breach?
A DDoS attack targets availability, not data, and on its own it does not give the attacker access to your systems. Treat it as a service incident, and check whether your national rules require you to report significant disruption.
How do we prevent website defacement?
Defacement needs write access, so most prevention is about access: patch the content system and its extensions, remove unused extensions, enforce multi-factor authentication and least privilege for publishers, keep the admin panel off the open internet, and protect registrar and DNS accounts. A web application firewall helps by filtering known exploit requests, but it cannot stop someone publishing with stolen credentials.
Which government web pages should we protect first?
Start with the pages people depend on at critical moments: emergency information, election and results pages, payment and application forms, and the homepage of each official domain. Make them cacheable or static where possible and give them the tightest publishing controls.
How do we start with BrandPort?
Request a briefing. BrandPort is offered by invitation. Tell us about your official websites, the events you plan around, and whether you want to discuss the Website and government firewall or Firewall and traffic limits.
Request a briefing
By invitation. If you want to discuss DDoS resilience and defacement risk across your official websites, tell us about your estate and we will follow up.
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